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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

s

LOUIS LEE MACIAL,

I

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 920316-CA

Category No. 2

t

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of three counts of
distribution of, or offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, each a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), as
the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case not
involving a conviction of a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court correctly determine that the
prosecution's peremptory challenge of a juror was not racially
motivated?

A party attacking a peremptory jury challenge on

equal protection grounds must establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination; if a prima facie case is established,
the challenged party must then provide a race-neutral explanation
to rebut the prima facie case.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,

93-94, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1721 (1986); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329,
338 (Utah 1991),
On appeal, the trial court's factual findings of
whether purposeful discrimination has occurred must be given
deference and will only be set aside if clearly erroneous.

State

v. Cantu fill, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989); State v. Harrison,
805 P.2d 769, 778 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah
1991).

If inadequate factual findings exist, the matter must be

remanded to the trial court for further determination.
476 U.S. at 100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725; State v. Cantu m ,
591, 597 (Utah 1988).

Batson,
750 P.2d

If purposeful discrimination in the use of

the state's peremptory challenges is ultimately found, reversal
of the defendant's conviction is mandated without regard to the
harmlessness of the constitutional error.
100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725.

Batson, 476 U.S. at

Contra Harrison, 805 P.2d at 780; Cantu

XXI, 750 P.2d at 597 (both incorrectly holding that a "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is applicable).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged on November 6, 1991 with three
counts of unlawful distribution of, or offering, agreeing,
consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance, each a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann* § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992) (Record [hereafter R.] at
-2-

6-8).

A jury trial was held February 26, 1992, in the Third

Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Michael R. Murphy, district judge, presiding (R. at 45-46).
Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced on May 4, 1992
(R. at 116-19).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts pertinent to this appeal involve the
questioning and challenge of prospective juror Bettye English (a
copy of the pertinent transcript pages is attached as an
addendum).

As with the other venire members, Ms. English gave a

synopsis of her background at the outset of voir dire (R. at
152).*

The court subsequently asked the panel if any of them

"had been a party to any lawsuit, whether it's criminal or civil"
(R. at 160). Eight people raised their hands, indicating their
involvement; one of them was Ms. English.

The first six persons

called on stated their involvement in open court.

When the court

called on Ms. English, she asked to approach the bench.

After an

off-the-record conference with Ms. English (involving counsel),
another prospective juror (No. 11) asked to approach.

The court

asked Ms. English and Juror No. 11 (R. at 195) to write notes
about their involvement (R. at 160-62).
The court then asked if anyone had family members or
friends in law enforcement.

Ms. English responded that her

daughter worked for the FBI. When asked what her daughter did,
*The transcript is internally paginated and also stamped with
record page numbers; citation to the transcript will be to the
record page numbers.
-3-

Ms. English responded, "Am I supposed to say it out loud?"

The

court asked if her daughter was an agent; Ms. English responded
that she did not know (R. at 164).
After voir dire, challenges for cause were registered,
evidently outside of the presence of the panel.

The State

challenged Juror No. 11 and the court sustained the challenge on
two bases (R. at 192-93).

The first was that Juror No. 11 had

been convicted of a felony which had been expunged.

The court

interpreted the jury qualification statute to disqualify a
convicted felon even if the conviction had been expunged (R. at
192-93).

The second basis was the court's observation that Juror

No. 11 had been arrested and convicted of an offense similar to
the one being heard.

Juror No. 11 had demonstrated obvious

emotion about narcotics agents and his own arrest and conviction
(R. at 193-94).
After Juror No. 11 was excused, the court said:
Let me just indicate this, that the note that
Mrs. Bettye English wrote reads as follows —
I don't want this note in the file. She
doesn't want it in the file. If I read it
and put it on the record, that's good enough.
That's fine. Dated 2-26-92. Reads: "I
Bettye English, was attempting to sue the
Board of Education because I was terminated
from my job through discrimination because I
did not have EEO involved — [. ]"
(R. at 202-203) (emphasis added).

The court and counsel then

discussed the fact that a detective who was a witness in the case
told the prosecutor that the detective had gone to school with
one of Ms. English's children (R. at 203-204).
cause was lodged against Ms. English.
-4-

No challenge for

Counsel exercised their peremptory challenges and the
State struck Ms. English (R. at 43). Defense counsel objected to
the striking of Ms. English, noting that she was the only black
person on the panel and alleging that the State had stricken her
"simply because she's a member of [a] minority race".

Counsel

noted that defendant "is Mexican-American or of Hispanic descent,
and it's a violation of his due process under the . . . federal
constitution [to strike Ms. English]."

(R. at 215). The court

asked the prosecutor to state his reasons for the peremptory
challenge (R. at 215-16).

The prosecutor responded:

I felt, based on her unwillingness to
speak before the rest of the group about a
matter that I didn't find — I'm sure she
felt that it was personal, naturally, but her
note indicated she had a lawsuit against the
school district. I didn't see it to be
something that was so personal that it would
be embarrassing to speak of before the group.
Frankly, I found her, for lack of a better
term, to be somewhat whiny. I don't think
she would be a good juror with the other
jurors. And that was the sole basis. It had
nothing to do with her race or anything else.
(R. at 216). The court found that explanation acceptable,
stating:
All right. You have made the record. I
mean — well, what Mr. Behrens has said to
me, to my mind, justifies, for reasons other
than race, his peremptory challenge. What he
has said here corresponded with my
observations of Ms. English's demeanor, and
that's why I ruled that the reasons stated by
Mr. Behrens are not made up, they are not
pretentious [sic] but, in fact, made sense to
me. That is the reason he did what he did
rather than doing it for reasons of race.

-5-

(R. at 216). At the conclusion of the trial, defendant renewed a
motion for a mistrial based on the challenge to Ms. English (R.
at 300-301).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial
court finding that the prosecutor's challenge of one of the
jurors was not racially motivated was clearly erroneous.

The

trial court correctly found that the prosecutor's explanation
showed that exercise of the peremptory challenge was neutral and
thus not purposeful racial discrimination.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE
STATE'S CHALLENGE OF MS. ENGLISH WAS RACIALLY
NEUTRAL AND THUS NOT PURPOSEFUL
DISCRIMINATION.
Defendant's claim is that the trial court erred in
finding that the prosecution's challenge of Ms. English was not
racially motivated.2

A party attacking a peremptory jury

2

At the trial level, defendant claimed it was "a denial of his
due process not to have any minorities on the jury" (R. at 215).
On appeal, he claims a violation of an equal protection right
(Brief of Appellant at 7). These are different claims requiring
different analyses. A jury selection process which systematically
excludes certain classes of people so that the jury pool does not
represent a fair cross section of the community is a violation of
due process under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 358-9
(1978). A racially motivated peremptory challenge is a violation
of the equal protection clause. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
In spite of defendant's use of different constitutional
terminology at trial and on appeal, the State is not arguing waiver
because counsel's use of the term "due process" at trial clearly
was a misstatement. His argument did not involve the composition
-6-

challenge on equal protection grounds must establish a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination; if a prima facie case is
established, the challenged party must then provide a raceneutral explanation to rebut the prima facie case.

Batson v.

Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 93-94, 106 S. Ct, 1712, 1721 (1986); State
v, Span, 819 P.2d 329, 338 (Utah 1991).
On appeal, the trial court's factual findings of
whether purposeful discrimination has occurred must be given
deference and will only be set aside if clearly erroneous•

State

v. Cantu fin, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989); State v. Harrison,
805 P.2d 769, 778 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah
1991).

If inadequate factual findings exist, the matter must be

remanded to the trial court for further determination.
476 U.S. at 100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725; State v. Cantu m ,
591, 597 (Utah 1988).

Batson,
750 P.2d

If purposeful discrimination in the use of

the state's peremptory challenges is ultimately found, reversal
of the defendant's conviction is mandated without regard to the
harmlessness of the constitutional error.
100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725.

Batson, 476 U.S. at

Contra Harrison, 805 P.2d at 780; Cantu

11), 750 P.2d at 597 (both incorrectly holding that a "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is applicable).
In Harrison, this Court stated:
a prima facie case of improper discrimination
in the exercise of peremptory challenges is
of the jury venire from which the jury was selected, i.e., a due
process fair cross section argument.
His argument focused,
instead, on the prosecution's peremptory challenge; thus, the claim
at trial involved equal protection.
-7-

raised by showing (1) that defendant is a
member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that
the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to
remove members of defendant's race[3] from
the jury panel; and (3) that these facts and
other relevant circumstances raise an
inference that the panelists were removed
because of their race.
805 P.2d at 774. As in Harrison, defendant has made no showing,
other than to state for the record that Ms. English was black,
that she was a member of a racial minority.

.Id,, at 776.

However, again as in Harrison, the State did not argue to the
trial court that defendant had failed to make out a prima facie
case. JEd. at 777.

The issue of whether defendant made out a

prima facie case of improper discrimination "became irrelevant
when the prosecutor failed to contest it at trial."

Jd. at 777.

See also. United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1108 (10th
Cir. 1991) ("the first issue of whether prima facie case of
discrimination exists becomes moot whenever the prosecutor offers
a race-neutral explanation for his peremptory challenges and the
trial court rules on the ultimate factual issue of whether the
prosecutor intentionally discriminated"); United States v.
Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987) ("when the
prosecution's explanation is of record, we will review only the
district court's finding of discrimination vel
3

non").

The Utah Supreme Court has noted:
Powers Tv. Ohio,
U.S.
, 111 S. Ct. 1364
(1991)] clearly eliminated any standing
requirement which Batson imposed and held that
a defendant of any race may challenge the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges on
equal protection grounds.
Span, 819 P.2d 329, 339 (Utah 1991) (footnote omitted).

-8-

When defendant objected to the State's use of a
peremptory challenge to strike Ms. English, the court asked the
State to explain it reasons (R. at 215-26).

The State then

presented its explanation which the trial court found to be raceneutral (R. at 216-17).

That finding should be accorded "great

deference on review" because it "turns largely on credibility."
Id. at 778.

The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Cantu (in , 778

P.2d 517 (Utah 1989), stated that
an explanation given by a prosecutor for the
exercise of a peremptory challenge must be
"(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being
tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and
(4) legitimate."
Cantu (in, 778 P.2d at 518 (quoting State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d
265, 268 (Mo.App. 1987)).
When asked by the court, the prosecution explained the
peremptory challenge:
[B]ased on her unwillingness to speak before
the rest of the group about a matter that I
didn't find — I'm sure she felt that it was
personal, naturally, but her note indicated
she had a lawsuit against the school
district. I didn't see it to be something
that was so personal that it would be
embarrassing to speak of before the group.
Frankly, I found her, for lack of a better
term, to be somewhat whiny. I don't think
she would be a good juror with the other
jurors. And that was the sole basis. It had
nothing to do with her race or anything else.
(R. at 216) (emphasis added).

The court found that explanation

to be acceptable:
[W]hat Mr. Behrens has said to me, to my
mind, justifies, for reasons other than race,
his peremptory challenge. What he has said
here corresponded with mv observations of Ms.
-9-

English's demeanor, and that's why I ruled
that the reasons stated by Mr. Behrens . . .
made sense to me.
(R. at 216) (emphasis added).

The trial court based its finding

of no Batson violation on its own observations of the demeanor of
the prospective juror.

Since that court is in a better position

to make those observations than an appellate court, this Court
should defer to that finding.

Harrison, 805 P.2d at 778.

Ms. English exhibited unwillingness to speak up before
the other jurors, which was evident in both her reluctance to
openly state that she had attempted to sue the Board of Education
for job discrimination (R. at 162) and her question about whether
she should vocally tell what her daughter did for the FBI (R. at
164).

This reluctance was so noticeable that when counsel spoke

in chambers about whether Ms. English's child had gone to school
with one of the police witnesses, the court said, "Let's bring
her in.

With her[,] I don't want to do it out there in public.

She has this thing about — " (R. at 203-204).
The prosecutor's explanation, based on the obvious
reluctance of Ms. English to speak up in front of the other
venire members, has no connection to race; consequently, it is
race-neutral.A

It is also related to the case being tried

*At trial, defendant did not articulate the Cantu (II) test
for judging the prosecutor's explanation of the peremptory
challenge.
Defendant merely objected that he thought the
challenged was solely on the basis of race. Because the different
factors of the Cantu (II) test were not specifically raised, the
trial court did not enter findings on each of the factors. The
record supports implicit findings that the factors are met.
-10-

because it involves Ms, English's reluctance to speak up in front
of the panel on this case.
The third requirement stated in Cantu is that the
explanation be "clear and reasonably specific."

Cantu (II), 778

P.2d at 518. The prosecutor did not challenge Ms. English just
because she was "whiny," he articulated his concern that she was
unwilling to speak out in front of the rest of the jury panel,
and thus, "would [not] be a good juror with the other jurors."
(R. at 216). Jurors have to communicate with each other during
their deliberations and be willing to articulate their positions;
Ms. English had shown herself unwilling to divulge much in front
of the rest of the jury panel.

The prosecutor was "reasonably

specific" in giving this explanation for the challenge.
Finally, the reason was legitimate as evidenced by the
trial court's statement that the explanation corresponded with
his own observations of Ms. English (R. at 216). The record also
supports the explanation.

Ms. English would not speak out about

her involvement in litigation even though six others had already
divulged their involvement in open court (R. at 160-66).

She

instead asked to approach the bench and then wrote a note to the
court about her involvement (R. at 162 and 203). Next, she was
hesitant to explain what her daughter did for the FBI, although
others had already divulged their relationship with law
enforcement in open court (R. at 164). Her hesitancy to speak
out was so noticeable that the court was going to bring her into
chambers to ask her whether her child had gone to school with one
•11-

of the witnesses, stating that she had a "thing" about speaking
up in open court (R. at 204). The prosecutor's explanation for
challenging Ms. English meets the test set out in Cantu (II).
The other factors defendant cites in arguing that the
challenge was not race-neutral are that (1) the prosecution did
not demonstrate that the juror had a bias which justified the
challenge; and (2) because similarly situated jurors were treated
differently.

Defendant did not articulate these factors below so

the court did not address them.

See State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d

1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) ("some form of specific

preservation of

claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record" in
order to allow appellate review).

To the extent that defendant's

general objection that the challenge was racially motivated
preserved these factors for argument, they are without merit.
The prosecution did not demonstrate that Ms. English
had a particular bias because she was not challenged for bias.
No one alleged that there was a "group bias" shared by Ms.
English.

This factor, quoted in Cantu (II) , is only one of

several whose presence "'will tend to show that the state's
reasons are . . . an impermissible pretext.'"

778 P.2d at 518

(quoting State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988)).

The

fact that there was no allegation of either group or individual
bias demonstrates that this factor is not relevant to this case.
Defendant's claim that Ms. English and Juror No. 11
were similarly situated is without basis in the record.

While

both of them handed notes to the judge to inform of their legal
-12-

involvement, the similarity ends there.

By notef Juror No. 11

informed the court that he had been convicted of a crime similar
to the charges here and had strong feelings about his arrest and
about narcotics agents (R. at 192-93).

The conviction had been

expunged which explained the secrecy Juror No. 11 displayed by
informing the court by a note.

Based on this information, the

court granted a challenge for cause and defendant did not object
(R. at 192-94).
This situation is vastly different from Ms. English's.
Her note informed the court about an attempted law suit regarding
job discrimination which demonstrated little reason for the
secrecy she showed (R. at 203). There also appeared to be little
reason why she could not answer in open court when asked what her
daughter did for the FBI; when informed she should "say it out
loud," she said she wasn't sure what her daughter did (R. at
164).

An attempted lawsuit and an answer that she did not know

what her daughter did for the FBI did not justify the mystery
with which Ms. English imbued them.

Juror No. 11's expunged

felony conviction was justifiably concealed from open court.
Juror No. 11's excusal for cause precludes any
comparison with Ms. English's excusal on peremptory challenge.
The reasons for and point at which they were excused show that
they were not similarly situated.

Since they were not similarly

situated, a comparison of their excusals does not demonstrate a
racially biased peremptory challenge.

-13-

In sum, defendant has failed to show that the trial
court's finding that the challenge of Ms. English was not
racially motivated is clearly erroneous.

The prosecutor gave a

legitimate, neutral and clear and reasonably specific explanation
for the challenge which was related to the case. An objection to
the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge is valid only when
the challenge is based "solely" on the juror's race.

Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
J
RESPECTFULLY submitted this «2- day of November,
1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

.ENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Ronald S. Fujino and James A. Valdez, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER
ASSOC, Attorneys for defendant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this -3-
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day of November, 1992.

ADDENDUM

1

including the Ensign.

2

the Sky and Telescope.

3
4

THE COURT:

What I didn't catch, Mr. Asper, is

what you do for a living.

5
6

We get the National Geographic,

MR. ASPER:
Service.

I work with the National Weather

I have been there 31 years.

7

THE COURT:

All right.

8

M s . English?

9 I

M S . ENGLISH:

Thank you.

Bettye English.

10

Salt Lake area.

11

Westminster College.

22

teacher, early childhood education.

13

the moment.

14 \

I attended the University of Utah and
I graduated.

An elementary
I'm not employed at

I'm originally from Texas.

I'm married.

My husband is a paramedic at

15

Tooele Army Depot.

16

degree in commercial art.

17

think he was born in Kentucky, though.

18
19

I live in the

He has a degree in psychology, a
He's originally from Ohio.

I

I'm not sure.

I have four grandchildren, six children of my
own, and I raised two foster sons.

20

I subscribe to Ebony magazine, Field and

21

Stream.

We take the Tribune when we can afford it.

22

lot of teacher magazines that I get.

23

all of them.

24

THE COURT:

25

Mr. Beckett?

All right.

A

I can't remember

Thank you, M s . English.

20

000152

was innocent?
MS. WILSON:
THE COURT:

Not guilty.
In the criminal case where the

defendant was found guilty, do you remember what the
charges were?
MS. WILSON:

I do not specifically remember.

It's too long.
THE COURT:

What about the criminal case where

the jury verdict was not guilty?

Do you remember what

the charges were there?
MS. WILSON:

This was a fraud-type case in that

instance.
THE COURT:
anyone?

All right.

Thank you.

Anyone else serve as a juror?
MR. KAPOS:

Did I miss

Mr. Kapos?

Fifteen years ago I was dismissed

on a case because I knew the defendant.
THE COURT:

Anyone else?

The record should

indicate there's no further showing of hands.
Have any of you —

now, when I ask you these

questions, I don't care about divorce cases, but have any
of you been a party to any lawsuit, whether it's criminal
or civil, whether you were a plaintiff or a defendant
and, if so, please raise your hand.
Mr. Giles, can you tell us what that was?
MR. GILES:

I have one existing right now, but
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I was partners in a dry cleaners.

We1re being sued by

the people we were renting from.
THE COURT: All right.

Any other cases?

Mr. Page, did I see your hand?

All right.

I

assume you have some small claims matters?
MR. PAGE:

Some pending right now with the

bus iness, collections.
THE COURT: Any other matters?
MR. PAGE:

No.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. —

I'm sorry,

Ms. Thompson.
We have had one where someone

MS. THOMPSON:
stole a machine.

The fellow was picked up for murder.

We have quite a few small claims.
THE COURT:

All right.

Anyone else?

Mr. Richards?
MR. RICHARDS:

I had a case about three years

ago against an ex-partner in the business.
THE COURT:

All right.

And, let's see,

Mr. Dalton.
MR. DALTON:

I had a case about four years ago,

small claims incident.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. HODGSON:

I know.

I have a claim on a lien waiver,

about three years I was in defense of a person that had
29
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received a speeding ticket and he wasn't driving.
turned out to be his brother.
THE COURT:

THE COURT:

That's about it.

Anyone else?

MS. ENGLISH:

It

Ms. English?

Well, may I approach the bench?

You may, along with counsel.

6 I

(Conference off the record.)

7

THE COURT:

8

Mr. Hodgson?

9

MR. HODGSON:

10

THE COURT:

11

write a note to me, write it.

12

don't want a snowball to start.

13

JurY-

14

with you.

15

start getting everybody sending up notes, we may be here

16

all day and you don't want to do that, do you?

17

Thank you# Ms. English.

May I approach?

We'll take a note.

If you want to

Let me just tell you, I
Our effort is to pick a

I love jurors, but I do need to keep some distance
We need to proceed expeditiously and if we

All right.

Any of you been witnesses before in

18

any case other than the case you have already told me

19

about and other than any divorce cases?

20

your hand.

21

Dr. Thorell.

22

DR. THORELL:

23

THE COURT:

If so, raise

Expert witness in a lawsuit case.

All right.

Anyone else?

The

24

record should indicate that there's no further showing of

25

hands.
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Lake County force.

1

THE COURT:

The courthouse bailiffs?

MR. KAPOS:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Who are they?

MR. KAPOS:

They're jail bailiffs.

THE COURT:

What are their names?

Are they

close personal friends?
MR. KAPOS:
boy.

Well, yes, Congas and another Greek

I can't think of his name.
THE COURT:

All right.

Gambrulos.
Anyone else?

Ms. English?
MS. ENGLISH :
THE COURT:

All right.

MS. ENGLISH :
THE COURT:

My daughter works for the FBI.
What does she do?

Am I supposed to say it out loud?

I mean is she an FBI agent?

MS. ENGLISH :

I'm not sure.

She didn't tell

me.
THE COURT:

She doesn't tell you?

Okay.

I

don't tell my wife what I do either.
Let 's see, Mr. Apedaile?
MR. APEDAILE:

I have a really close friend,

Kenneth Daily,r on the Salt Lake City police.
THE COURT:

Close friend personally?

Great

golfing buddy?
MR. APEDAILE: Yes.
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prosecuted?

J

MS, LEWIS:

No.

They weren't able to find

THE COURT:

All right.

|

anything.
Thank you.

1

Ms. Freed, did I see your hand up?

J

MS. FREED:

J

Yes.

Same thing, vandalism,

windows shot <
and things taken off the cars, parts and
spare tires.
THE COURT:

Any prosecutions?

J

MS. FREED:

No.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. KAPOS:

Ten years ago I had a pickup

Did I see other hands?

Mr. Kapos?

stolen.

It was never found.

And during the past year I

have had several break-ins in my little business where I
think they were just looking for a place to sleep at
night.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Anyone else?

Mr. Asper?

MR. ASPER:

About seven or eight years ago our

home was broken into, intended burglary, and I believe
it's by professionals but they haven't heard anything
since then, ik few of the items were recovered, that
that's about it.
THE COURT:

All right.

MS. ENGLISH :

Ms. English?

My son had an electric car stolen
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from the house, and someone broke into his truck and took
a jack and CB and stuff like that.

We haven1t recovered

it.
THE COURT:

Has there been any prosecutions?

MS. ENGLISH: No.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, Ms. English.

I have indicated to you generally what this
case is about.

It involves charges —

emphasizing the word "charges" —

again, I'm

of drug offenses. And

I want to ask you some questions about that, because
those types of matters are in the news media a lot, and I
need to inquire whether or not you have such strong
feelings about those types of matters that you would be
unable to try this case in a fair and unbiased manner,
remembering that Mr. Macial is presumed innocent,
maintains that presumption, until the State proves, if at
all, his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
So all I'm trying to probe is whether or not
you might have such strong feelings concerning controlled
substances or drugs that you would be unable to proceed
in the fashion that I have described.

If you do have

such strong feelings, please indicate by raising your
hand.
Ms. Thompson?
MS. THOMPSON:

I have an ex-son-in-law who was
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as a juror.

And in this case I don't think that's the

case. And I think she should serve as a juror and would
be a very fine juror.

And I don't think the challenge is

sufficient for cause.
MR. VALDEZ:
her disability.
are disabled.

My challenge isn't on the basis of

I agree with you in terms of people that

My concern is her equivocation concerning

8

the drug issue and the four-year-old child that is the

9

recently adopted child.

10\

THE COURT:

You know, my equivocation is, in

11

part, understanding the question, and in her case, when I

12

asked in open court, it was a little more difficult

13

because I was further away.

14

hearing, people, you know, wonder, "What in the world is

15

this judge saying?"

16

And even if she had perfect

And I think that it's proper, as the Supreme

17

Court says, that even though they use the term

18

"rehabilitate," I think that's the wrong term, because if

19

they need rehabilitation, they shouldn't be on the jury

20

anyway.

21

she would not have such a bias and prejudice.

22

clarified if her —

23

to interfere with her attention and she promised to set

24

that aside.

25 J

But I think it was clarified in her answers that
She also

I think, that the child is not going

So the challenge to Ms. Lewis is overruled.

The challenge to Mr. Hodgson is sustained on
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two grounds.

One, my reading of the statute indicates

that the purpose for expungement is to allow people to
get on with that part of their life that may be —

that

they need to get on with, economically and in such a way
so their past history does not interfere with that.

And

that is that they do not have to report to the employers
or in those types of circumstances a conviction or an
8 J
9

arrest that has been expunged.
The statute on qualifications of jurors appears

10

to be unequivocal and unconditional on its face.

11

that's how you construe it, and that is an expunged

H

felony is still a felony for the purpose of the juror

13

qualifications statute.

14 I

Additionally, my observation —

And

the reason why

15 I

I was asking questions of Mr. Hodgson is because I was

16 I

watching his demeanor and his facial expressions were

17 I

such that he was going through, in our presence, some

18 I

type of upheaval and reliving the incident that he has

19 I

revealed to u s .

20

a felony drug charge.

21

statement that, "Well, you folks have never woke up to

22

the barrel of a .45," and indicating that he would

23

believe his cousin, without any further statement, is

24

pregnant with a concept that any other narcotics agent he

25

would not believe.

And that is the plea of guilt he made to
And when you combine that with his
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And I think that his demeanor and his answers
were such that he is biased and prejudiced against
narcotics agents, because of his past experience and then
he could not serve as a juror and be unbiased.

So I am

going to grant that and sustain that challenge for cause.
6 I
7
8

Are there any other jurors we need to talk
about?
MR. VALDEZ:

I don't think so.

That puts us at

9 I

a problem because of the appellate attorney in our

JO

office, if t h e r e f s a conviction on this, may look at this

11

aspect and this issue and may want to use that as an

12

issue for appeal.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. VALDEZ:

15

I get reversed all the time.
Well, with you the problem is that

we told M r . Hodgson this wouldn't go any further.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. VALDEZ:

I understand.

And I need to

—

I don't think it would go any

18

further than the eyes of the person who responds in the

19

appellate, and I guess it would be the appellate court in

20

this matter.

21

But to an extent, that is public and

THE COURT:

—

Well, let me do this, let me issue

11

an oral order right now, is that the discussions on the

23

record are —

14

are hereby ordered sealed and will be unsealed only upon

25

order of the Court further on the order of the Court.

here with M r . Hodgson and the note he sent,
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So w h a t ' s important is that Gayle understands
that what w i l l happen, in essence, is that if that is
necessary, what I'll do is issue an order that it's
unsealed solely for the p u r p o s e s of appeal, and no
reference can be m a d e to the p e r s o n ' s name in any
g I

briefing.

W e ' l l refer to the person as Juror N o . 1 1 .

7

MR. V A L D E Z :

8

MR. B E H R E N S :

That's t h e best way to do it.
Perhaps w e could bring him back

9

in and tell him what w e ' r e doing, just so he k n o w s we're

10

not going to mention it?

11

T H E COURT:

12

MR. V A L D E Z :

A l l right.
The other thing, for the record,

13

if you may, Judge, in order that I can —

we'll probably

14

do it anyway, but I just want to m a k e sure —

15

that no undue attention is brought to the people that

16

have been challenged for cause and that may be justified

17

for cause, you ask that we not excuse them until after.

in order

\8\

T H E COURT:

19

(Whereupon, M r . Hodgson returned to the jury

20

I don't d o .

Some judges d o .

room.)

21

T H E COURT:

T h e record should indicate that

22 1

M r . H o d g s o n is p r e s e n t .

23 J

brought you back in is to explain to you what h a s

24 I

happened.

25

MR. HODGSON:

M r . Hodgson, t h e r e a s o n why w e

Okay.
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THE COURT:

I have ruled that the law

prohibiting people who have been convicted of a felony
from serving as a juror is not changed or amended by the
expungement statute, which means even though your record
has been expunged for purposes of serving on the jury, it
has not been expunged according to my ruling and,
therefore, you1re disqualified from serving as a juror.
8 I

MR. HODGSON:

9

THE COURT:

Okay.
The main reason why we wanted to

10

talk to you on the record is that the promise I made to

11

you about keeping this private, this issue, if Mr. Macial

12I

is convicted, there's a good likelihood that my ruling or

13

rulings may be appealed, which means that they'll need a

14

transcript of these discussions we have had with you in

15I

order to determine whether or not I excluded a juror that

16I

I should not have.

17

MR. HODGSON:

18 J

THE COURT:

19 J

Okay.
I have ordered that the transcript

of our discussions with you and your note be sealed.

20

MR. HODGSON:

21 J

THE COURT:

Thank you.
They can be unsealed only upon my

22I

order, if the matter does go on appeal.

Then what I'll

23 J

do is order that a transcript can be seen only by the two

24

lawyers who are handling the appeal and any reference

25

they make —

in any reference they make to this portion
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of the transcript, they are not to refer to you by name
but to refer to you as Juror No. 11.

So all the

information will be out, but we1re talking about
hypothetical Juror No. 11.
In fact, let me order this to the court
reporter:

That all discusses we have had in this, rather

than reading "Mr. Hodgson, •• "The Court, •• "Mr. Behrens,11
and "Mr. Valdez," will read instead, "Mr. Hodgson, Juror
No. 11." And any reference, any answers to questions
that Mr. Hodgson gave out in the courtroom, rather than
referring to him as Juror Hodgson should be referred to
him as Juror No. 11.
Is that all right?
THE REPORTER:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Then we have a double protection

All right.

Furthermore, I did rule in this

that way.

case to the juror disqualification under the statute that
it appeared to me that —

and I donft mean —

more the legal term, not meant to be nasty —

this is
that I

think you would be natural to serve as an unbiased juror
in this case.
MR. HODGSON:
THE COURT:

Okay.
So there are two reasons that I

have excluded you from the jury.

What we1re going to do
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MR. VALDEZ:

I don't think there's anything we

have done here that has prejudiced Mr. Macial.

We talked

about specific concerns, these jurors —
THE DEFENDANT:

Uh-huh.

MR. VALDEZ:

and some of their answers. The

—

woman I was concerned with because she said she had a
four-month-old child at home and she was —

or wanted to

make sure that she would be able to listen despite her
disability, be able to listen and concentrate on the
testimony.
She said that she could, and the judge decided
that she could stay on the potential jury panel.
THE DEFENDANT:
MR. VALDEZ:

Okay.

The other individual, he handed us

a note, and I don't know if you saw the note —•
THE DEFENDANT:

No.

To me, anyway, I don't

know how to read that much, you know.
MR. VALDEZ:

We asked him

THE DEFENDANT:
much, you know.

—

I understand a little bit, not

But this is —

MR. VALDEZ:

We asked him some questions, but

the judge, as the judge, decided he didn't think he could
be impartial, so he'll be excused, along with a couple of
other people.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me just indicate this,
72

j(Ki2^2

that the note that Mrs. Bettye English wrote reads as
follows —

I don't want this note in the file.

doesn't want it in the file.

If I read it and put it on

the record, that's good enough.
26-92.

Reads:

She

That's fine.

Dated 2-

f

'I Bettye English, was attempting to sue

the Board of Education because I was terminated from my
job through discrimination because I did not have EEO
involved —

"

I have to start again.

All right.

The other note from Mr. Hodgson I

intended to give to the court reporter to keep
MR. VALDEZ:
THE COURT:

That's fine.
—

MR. VALDEZ:
THE COURT:

~

with her notes.

That's fine.
Okay.

Then you can put a caption

on there in handwriting.
All right.

Do you want to take a short break?

Mr. Behrens brought one thing to my attention.
I don't know if she answered that she didn't know anybody
that was —

might have been testifying, but Det. Sampson,

apparently, indicated to Mr. Behrens that he had gone to
school with her son, although I don't think that she
remembered that.
MR. VALDEZ:

Who is the "she"?

MR. VALDEZ:

Ms. English.

MR. BEHRENS:

She didn't even say her son.

She
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said her kid.
THE COURT:

Let's bring her in.

don't want to do it out there in public.
thing about

With her I
She has this

~

MR. BEHRENS:
THE COURT:
record on it?

Okay.

Don't you think we ought to make a

Do you want to make a record?

MR. BEHRENS:

She stood up and they were asked

if they knew anybody, and she didn't indicate.
that he went to school with one of her children
THE COURT:

The fact
—

There's no reason for any further

voir dire of her?
MR. VALDEZ:

That's correct.

MR. BEHRENS:
THE COURT:

I don't see any reason.

Okay.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings
were had in open court:)
THE COURT:

The record should indicate that the

jury panel is present.

Mr. Behrens is present,

Mr. Valdez is present, Mr. Macial is present.
I'm sorry that it took us, obviously, a lot
more time than we expected.
working all the time.

Rest assured, we were

We're not fooling around with the

exceptions noted on the record thus far, do you pass this
panel for cause?
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1

MR. BEHRENS:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. VALDEZ:

4

but I can't remember.

5

What was the charge?
Armed robbery.
I had a case with your version to,

Judge, you need to put something on the record.

6

I don't know if I'm required to, but maybe to be safe, I

7

probably ought to.

8

I'm going to object to the S t a t e f s peremptory

9

challenge of M s . English.

10

note, was the only black person in the jury.

U

that the only reason that the State may have pre-empted

12

her is because they may feel and —

13

misrepresent what your feelings are, Mr. Behrens

14

Mr. Behrens and I usually get along in the best of times,

15

but I think that there may be, in his mind, the feeling

16 1

that simply because she's a member of the minority race,

17

and in fact she is black, that she might be more

18

sympathetic to the defendant.

19

M s . English, as the Court will
I think

I'm sorry if I
—

The defendant, the record ought to note, is

20

Mexican-American or of Hispanic descent.

21

of his due process not to have any minorities on the

22

jury, whether they be black or Hispanic, and it's a

23

violation of his due process under the state constitution

24

and under the federal constitution.

25

THE COURT:

All right.

It's a denial

M r . Behrens, could you
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state for the Court what your reasons for exercising
peremptory challenges on Ms. English are?
MR. BEHRENS:

I felt, based on her

unwillingness to speak before the rest of the group about
a matter that I didn't find —

I'm sure she felt that it

6 J

was personal, naturally, but her note indicated she had a

7

a lawsuit against the school district.

8

to be something that was so personal that it would be

9

embarrassing to speak of before the group.

10

I didn't see it

Frankly, I found her, for lack of a better

11

term, to be somewhat whiny.

12

good juror with the other jurors.

13

basis.

14

else.

15

I don't think she would be a
And that was the sole

It had nothing to do with her race or anything

THE COURT:

You have made the

16

record.

17

to my mind, justifies, for reasons other than race, his

IS

peremptory challenge.

19

with my observations of Ms. English's demeanor, and

20

that's why I ruled that the reasons stated by Mr. Behrens

21I

are not made up, they are not pretentious but, in fact,

22 I

made sense to me.

23 J

rather than doing it for reasons of race.

24I
25 I

I mean —

All right.

well, what Mr. Behrens has said to me,

What he has said here corresponded

That is the reason he did what he did

MR. VALDEZ:

Perhaps I ought to respond to

that, because my perception of her demeanor was nothing
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like that.

Of course, we all have different

perspectives.
THE COURT:

It's like beauty; it depends on who

the beholder is.
MR. VALDEZ:
THE COURT:

That's correct.
And I know# obviously, there can be

differences of opinion.

That's why some people would

strike some jurors and some would not.

But Ifm

satisfied.
We'll see you at 1:30.
MR. BEHRENS: Yes.
MR. VALDEZ: Yes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

(Luncheon recess, 12:10 p.m.)
THE COURT:

The record should indicate that the

jury is now present.

Is counsel read to proceed with opening
statement?

MR. BEHRENS: We are, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Behrens.
MR. BEHRENS: Thank you, your Honor.
Judge, it would be my motion to

MR. VALDEZ:
exclude the witnesses.
THE COURT:

Members of the jury, Mr. Valdez has

invoked what is called the exclusionary rule.

That rule,
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THE COURT:

That's what I mean, now.

Then come

back and go straight through with jury instructions.
MR. VALDEZ:

That's fine.

MR- BEHRENS:
THE COURT:

That's fine.

All right.

Members of the jury,

we're going to take a recess from ten to fifteen minutes.
I'll try to keep it as close to ten as possible.
Remember the admonition.
quickly as we can.

We'll see you as

No shorter than ten nor, hopefully,

longer than fifteen minutes.
(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

The record should indicate that the

jury has exited.
Do you want to go ahead and make your motion?
MR. VALDEZ:

Well, my motion was going to be

for a directed verdict.

I don't think that the State has

provided sufficient evidence in order to give it to the
jury.

One witness is a gentleman, I guess, who we're

going to believe.

I need to make it for the record.

THE COURT:

You do.

And it's a question of who

they are going to believe and, therefore, reasonable
minds could differ.
MR. VALDEZ:
motion for a mistrial.

I should probably also renew my
And the basis is that the jury

selection process in this case, in that a juror was not
171
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1

included who I consider to have probably been more of a

2 I

peer to Mr. Macial than anybody else without, I think,

3 I

sufficient ground or reason.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. VALDEZ:

6

THE COURT:

7 I
8 I
9
10
11
12

What juror are you talking about?
Mrs. English.
All right.

Your motion is noted.

Motion for a new trial is denied.
Have you had an opportunity to look at those
instructions?
MR. VALDEZ:

I have gone through them.

I don't

think there's anything there that I have a problem with.
MR. BEHRENS:

13

instruction.

14

witness instruction.

15

THE COURT:

I only got as far as the long

We won't need No. 13.

You're right.

That's the expert

What I'll do is just

16

tell them we jump from 12 to 14.

17

remove Exhibit 13 from all their sets and I'll just tell

18

them, "Don't pay any attention to the fact that we have

19 I

skipped a number, but we just don't have a 13."

20

So, Gene, would you

If you want to go ahead and take a few minutes

21

and look at those, I'll stand here and stare at you.

22 I

It's like watching somebody eating.

23
24 J
25

All right.

We'll start in ten minutes, then

we'll do jury instructions.
MR. BEHRENS:

Actually, I like your last ones
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